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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law shields individuals from abuses of power at the hands
of administrative agencies.' The Federal Administrative Procedures Act
(APA)2 provides a set of standards for reviewing different types of agency
action.' A court's ability to protect individuals against agency abuses of pow-
er relates directly to the scope of review permitted by the APA, which varies
depending on the type of agency action at issue.' The APA's standard of re-
view for formal agency action is the "substantial evidence" standard.5 Courts
review informal agency action under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.'
Due to an agency's specialized knowledge, however, courts grant considerable
deference to agency decisions under these standards.'
Part I of this Survey discusses two cases in which the Tenth Circuit ap-
plied the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards of re-
view. In Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp.,' the Tenth Circuit followed
the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reasoning regarding the convergence
of the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review.9
The Tenth Circuit concluded that when determining factual support, both stan-
dards require "substantial evidence" to uphold an agency's decision.' In
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," the
Tenth Circuit deferred a question of law involving an agency's contract
1. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.1 (3d ed. 1991). Administrative law
provides the legal principles by which agencies exercise their power. Id. Congress exercises con-
trol over agencies by establishing standards and procedures in an agency's enabling statute and by
policing day-to-day agency action through oversight committees. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UN-
DERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9-9[B] (2d ed. 1992).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
4. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624 ("If the scope of review is too broad, agencies
are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts"; conversely, if
the scope is too restrictive, review becomes meaningless since "it prevents full inquiry into the
question of legality.").
5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (stating that cases subject to §§ 556-557, which govern hearings
and initial decisions, or "otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing" are subject to
that standard).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (providing that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action
which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624-25 (explaining that deference to administrative
expertise and calendar pressure have narrowed the scope of review by courts); see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (finding that
agencies have been delegated authority to make policy choices and judges, "who have no constitu-
ency," must afford deference to an agency's decisions).
8. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Inc., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
10. Id.
1. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
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interpretation, using the arbitrary and capricious standard.'2 In granting defer-
ence to the agency's decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's
conclusion that the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.13 implicitly modified earlier cases that
withheld deference on questions involving contract interpretations. 4
Part II of this Survey examines the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the
social security regulations governing the adjudication of benefit disputes. In
O'Dell v. Shalala,5 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the "final decision," which
courts review under the social security regulations, as including any new evi-
dence that a complainant presents to the Appeals Council. 6 The court's deci-
sion clarified what constitutes the record of review, and resolved two conflict-
ing lower court holdings.'7
I. REVIEWING AGENCY DECISIONS
A. Informal Agency Action and the Convergence of the Substantial Evidence
and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review:
Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp.'
1. Background
The Federal Administrative Procedures Act 9 (APA) establishes standards
for judicial review of federal agency action." The APA standards are de-
signed to provide a check on agency authority while simultaneously ensuring
that each agency is able to perform its task within the authority granted to
it.11
Courts review formal agency action under the substantial evidence stan-
dard.22 The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
12. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1485. The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) action under the substantial evidence standard pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1994) which applies to the Commission's factual decisions. Northwest Pipeline,
61 F.3d at 1485.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1486.
15. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
16. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859.
17. Id. (noting that the two opinions were "diametrically opposed").
18. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). The judicial review provisions of the APA apply "except to the
extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(a)(2). The APA contains six provisions establishing the
scope of review including: (1) substantial evidence, (2) arbitrary and capricious, (3) "contrary to a
constitutional right," (4) "in excess of statutory jurisdiction," (5) "failing to observe procedures re-
quired by law," and (6) "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial
de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706(A)-(F).
21. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 9.2.12, at 583 (1986)
(explaining that the standards of review reflect the scope of authority granted to an agency). See
generally Phillip F. Smith, Jr., Administrative Law Survey of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
71 DENY. U. L. REV. 801, 815-16 (1994) (discussing the effect of the different standards of re-
view).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, 706(2)(E); ARTHuR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMow, STATE
AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.4, at 625 (1989). Formal agency action consists of hear-
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."23 When reviewing an agency's decision, a court examines the "record
as a whole" to determine if substantial evidence supports the agency's deci-
sion.24 The APA mandates the application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard when reviewing informal agency action.' In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,26 the Court stated that under the arbitrary and
capricious standard,27 a court must determine whether an agency has articu-
lated a rational basis for its action.2" Under this "narrow" standard,29 the
court may not substitute its own rationale, but must review an agency's action
on the grounds articulated by the agency itself.30 In doing so, the court must
focus on the informal administrative record.3' The arbitrary and capricious
standard further requires an agency to explain how it proceeded from its find-
ings to its subsequent action.32 However, authorities on administrative law
have typically characterized the substantial evidence standard as more de-
manding than the arbitrary and capricious standard, although the Supreme
Court has never explicitly resolved this supposed difference.33 Since both the
arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards require sufficient
factual support in the record,34 courts have referred to the tests as converging,
and to any articulated distinction between them as "largely semantic."35
ings subject to the APA "trial-type" provisions of §§ 556-557 of the APA. Fox, supra note 1, §
50 (defining a "trial-type" proceeding as an "adversarial process, intended to be similar to, but not
identical with, a civil bench trial in federal court"); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (finding that review under the substantial evidence standard is
authorized under the APA's rule-making provisions or "when the agency action is based on a
public adjudicatory hearing").
23. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act required the same
standard of proof as the APA, and finding that the substantial evidence standard required the court
to consider evidence that "fairly detracts from [the record's] weight").
24. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 (acknowledging that a "reviewing court is not barred
from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence support-
ing that decision is substantial").
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)-(2)(A). See generally Fox, supra note 1, §§ 58-60 (discussing the lack
of a "trial-type" hearing and informal nature of the informal agency action).
26. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
27. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
28. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416). Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard requires the
court to consider "whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
29. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
30. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 50.
31. Smith, supra note 21, at 815-16 (discussing review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard).
32. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 50; 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.4, at 202-03 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the "reasoned
decision-making" in which the agency must engage).
33. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4, at 202. Since both the substantial evidence
and arbitrary and capricious standards are extremely deferential, "courts have experienced difficul-
ty applying the distinction the Court continues to draw" regarding the characterization of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard as the more lenient. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33
(discussing the arbitrary and capricious standard).
34. BoNnFILD & ASiMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625 (noting that courts determine factual
support under both standards based on a "reasonableness review" standard).
35. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.5, at 202-03 (citing cases referring to the tenden-
1996]
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Facts
In Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 6 a certified class of farmers
challenged the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service's (ASCS)
decision to reduce wheat crop deficiency payments.37 Due to flooding, these
farmers had been unable to plant their winter wheat during the fall.3" Con-
cerned with the effect of late planting on deficiency payments, the farmers
held a meeting with state officials.39 The farmers left the meeting with the
impression that program wheat could be planted after the designated planting
season without reductions in deficiency payments, provided it was planted in a
"workmanlike" manner.' After having planted their crops, the farmers re-
ceived notice that the ASCS had reduced deficiency payments for late planted
wheat.4
ASCS's initial decision was based on the determination that program
regulations allowed reductions in deficiency payments for late planting.4'
With the exception of this late planting finding, the ASCS failed to state the
rules it applied or the factors it considered in making the initial decision to
reduce deficiency benefits.43 The state ASCS committee, and subsequently
the Deputy Administrator of State and County Operations, affirmed the initial
ASCS decision in informal hearings." The district court agreed with the ad-
ministrative committees and affirmed the ASCS's decision under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. 5
cy of the standards to converge); see Fox, supra note 1, § 76[C] (explaining then-Judge Scalia's
view that there is no difference between the two tests in terms of factual support); see also
BONFIELD & AsIMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625 ("The prevailing view is that judicial re-
view ... under a substantial evidence standard is no different than under an arbitrary and capri-
cious standard."). Prior Tenth Circuit case law recognized that "[t]he 'substantial evidence' test
has been equated with the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review." Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 904 F.2d 1456, 1459 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
36. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
37. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1564-65. ASCS reduced the payments for winter wheat as fol-
lows: 20% in January, 35% in February, and 100% in March. Id. at 1570. Spring wheat planted in
March was reduced 30% and spring wheat planted after March was reduced 100%. Id. at 1570-71.
38. Id. at 1569.
39. Id. Class members participated in the 1987 Price Support and Adjustment Program for
wheat which guarantees each farmer "the target price for their crop, if the ultimate market price
falls below that price, farmers are entitled to'deficiency payments' to make up the difference." Id.
at 1567. The statutes implementing the Price Support and Adjustment Program are: The Agricul-
ture Act of 1949 §§ 101-356, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1471 (1994) (creating deficiency payments); 7
U.S.C. §§ 1308 to 1308-5 (1994) (limiting deficiency payments); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1445 to 1445-3
(1994) (implementing deficiency payments).
40. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1569.
41. Id. at 1564.
42. Id. at 1564, 1570.
43. Id. at 1565.
44. Id. at 1571.




The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in choosing to apply
the arbitrary and capricious standard.' In reversing the lower court, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the district court had supplied its own rationale for the
agency's decision rather than reviewing the record to determine if the agency
"articulated a reasoned basis for its conclusions" as the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard requires.' To determine the proper application of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard, the Tenth Circuit adopted then-Judge Scalia's
convergence analysis.' Under this theory, "informal agency action will be set
aside as arbitrary if it is unsupported by 'substantial evidence."' 49 The factual
support required to withstand the arbitrary and capricious analysis does not
substantially differ from the factual support required to satisfy the substantial
evidence standard. 0 A decision, therefore, unsupported by substantial evi-
dence "in the APA sense" would be arbitrary." Recognizing that courts have
characterized the substantial evidence standard as more demanding, the Tenth
Circuit stated that adopting the convergence theory did not entail substituting
the arbitrary and capricious standard with the "arguably more stringent" sub-
stantial evidence standard. 2
3. Analysis
In the context of analyzing factual support, a dual application of both the
arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards"' results in "con-
vergence theory," the ultimate test of reasonableness. 4 The Tenth Circuit, in
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,5 equat-
ed its practice of deferring to agencies on questions of law with a reasonable-
ness test that agencies use to interpret statutes. 6 Because the convergence
theory entails both the arbitrary and capricious and the substantial evidence
standards, the Tenth Circuit may have implicitly equated all three stan-
dards-convergence, reasonableness, and the practice of deference-while
applying them to a question of law." Since Judge Scalia's theory was based
46. Id. at 1580.
47. Id.; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(explaining that the reviewing court may only uphold an agency's decision on its own rationale).
For a discussion of the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, see supra notes 26-35
and accompanying text.
48. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Inc., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84); see Fox, supra note 1, §76[C] (ex-
plaining Judge Scalia's view that substantial evidence is a specific application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard and does not require more factual support).
51. O/enhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (quoting Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684).
52. Id. at 1575-76.
53. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
54. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 (citing ScHwARTz, supra note 1, § 10.8);
BONFIELD & ASIMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625.
55. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
56. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1486 (citing Long Island Lighting Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 20 F.3d 494, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
57. Id. at 1487 (holding that the agency decision was "a rationally based, reasonable con-
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on the standards' operation when determining questions of factual support, the
extension of the convergence theory to at least some questions of law may
turn "substantial evidence" into a threshold requirement to support both factual
and legal determinations."
Although courts have traditionally described the arbitrary and capricious
standard as "more lenient" than the substantial evidence standard, it may only
be "less stringent" in regard to the distinction between what evidence a court
may or may not rely on when reviewing an agency's decision." When re-
viewing an agency's informal decision under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, a court may consider all of the information that was before the agency
when it made its decision.' A review of formal agency action, on the other
hand, limits the court to the closed record.6 Consequently, the arbitrary and
capricious standard appears to be more lenient only in regard to the nature of
the record that a court may review to determine whether an agency's decision
was rational. Both standards, however, apparently require the same quantum of
evidence to support an agency's decision. Regardless of where the court finds
factual support during its review of an informal decision, "substantial evi-
dence" appears to be the minimum amount of evidence required to uphold an
agency's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard.62
4. Other Circuits
The Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted the convergence
theory, and, therefore, appear to view the distinction between the arbitrary and
capricious and substantial evidence standards as "largely semantic" regarding
review of the factual bases of agency decisions.63 The Second Circuit views
struction, and is, therefore, entitled to ... deference"). See generally discussion infra part I.B
(discussing Northwest Pipeline and judicial review of questions of law). Note, however, that com-
ments made prior to Northwest Pipeline question the propriety of equating questions of law with
questions of fact. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.8.
58. See Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 (discussing the convergence of the arbitrary
and capricious standard and the substantial evidence standard).
59. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4 ("While the Court consistently characterizes
the arbitrary and capricious test as less demanding than the substantial evidence test, the Court has
never explained the difference between the two."); see American Paper Inst. v. American Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) (describing arbitrary and capricious as the more
lenient standard). The arbitrary and capricious standard does serve a purpose independent of re-
view for factual support. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4, at 203. The standard
ensures that the agency engaged in "reasoned decision making" and included an explanation of
how it reached its decision. Id. In a sense, this element is implied in the substantial evidence stan-
dard because the formal record will contain the basis for the agency's decision.
60. E.g., Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684.
61. See id. This limit did not originate with the arbitrary and capricious standard, but rather
in 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994), which requires that "the agency ... give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making." Id.
62. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 950 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing other Seventh Circuit
cases which found the distinction to be semantic); Amusement and Music Operators Ass'n v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 676 F.2d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir.) (holding that the distinction is largely
semantic and that the criteria tend to converge), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Associated
Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that the "con-
troversy is semantic in some degree"); see also Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the
Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal
[Vol. 73:3
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the significance of the substantial evidence standard as "limiting the agency to
the confines of the public record." Under informal action, however, the
D.C. Circuit applies the arbitrary and capricious standard to the evidence be-
fore an agency.' Under both standards, the quanta of support needed to up-
hold an agency decision are identical.'
Judge Scalia, however, acknowledged in Data Processing that there are
cases in which the standards do not converge. 67 An agency's action may be
arbitrary if it is an "abrupt and unexplained departure from agency precedent,"
even though it may be supported by substantial evidence." The arbitrary and
capricious standard thus operates as a "catchall, picking up administrative
misconduct" by enabling courts to strike down agency decisions as arbitrary
where the substantial evidence test is not applicable.69
B. Deference to Agencies on Questions of Law:
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission'
1. Background
The standard of review for agency decisions has been traditionally depen-
dent upon whether the issue was one of fact or law.7' As experts in a regu-
lated area, agencies were traditionally responsible for determining facts.72
Reviewing courts, therefore, accorded substantial deference to an agency's
factual decisions.73 Conversely, courts traditionally reviewed questions of law
de novo based upon courts' expertise in applying and interpreting the law.74
In 1984, the Court altered the traditional distinction between law and fact
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.75 In
Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 553 (1986) (listing cases that apply the convergence
theory).
64. Associated Indus., 487 F.2d at 349-50.
65. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684-85; McGrath, supra note 63, at 555.
66. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 ("[lIt is impossible to conceive of a 'nonarbitrary'
factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not substantial in the APA sense.").
67. Id. at 684-85; McGrath, supra note 63, at 555.
68. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683.
69. Id.
70. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
71. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.5, at 632; Phillip G. Oldham, Regulatory Consent De-
crees: An Argument for Deference to Agency Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 396 (1995)
("Traditional common law notions guided the early period in administrative law, dividing the
authority of courts and agencies along the lines of law and fact-similar to the roles played by
judge (law) and jury (fact).").
72. Oldham, supra note 71, at 396.
73. ScHwARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.6.
74. Id. (describing the "law-fact distinction"). De novo review is defined as reviewing the
matter "as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990); see also Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960) (noting that an agency's contract interpretation is subject to
de novo review); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[l]f the action is based upon a
determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an or-
der may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.").
75. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Oldham, supra note 71, at 395 (explaining how Chevron "ex-
ploded the idea that courts are best situated to interpret statutes"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
19961
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Chevron, the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the EPA's inter-
pretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act.76 The Court
determined that the EPA's interpretation reflected a pure policy decision in an
area where Congress had delegated authority to the EPA."' The Court's deci-
sion produced a two-part test for judicial review of an agency's statutory con-
struction."
First, courts must determine if "Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue."79 Both courts and agencies must defer to clear Con-
gressional intent." Once Congress has resolved any policy disputes, any re-
maining issue becomes one of law." By deferring to the agency's statutory
interpretation, as required by Chevron, the Court "gives force to the principle
of legislative supremacy" by requiring policy decisions to be made by the
elected branches of government.8 2
Second, policy issues arise when congressional intent is unclear or ambig-
uous. 3 As a result, the reviewing court must apply step two of the Chevron
test which determines "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute," and thus implements the underlying policy. 4
Since the Court decided Chevron in 1984, the case's impact has been
enormous, as courts have applied its test in over 1,000 cases. 5 The wide-
spread application of the Chevron analysis, however, has produced an
73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 87 (1994) ("Prior to Chevron... the primary and ultimate authority for
interpreting statutes resided in the judiciary.").
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41. The statute at issue in Chevron required "permits for the
construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5)
(1994). Congress did not explicitly define "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act or its legisla-
tive history, but did provide that the administrator was to take into account both economic and
environmental interests. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)(A). The EPA defined "stationary source" to in-
clude all sources within the same industrial grouping, forming the bubble concept. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 840.
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-66.
78. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.2 (discussing the Chevron "two-step").
79. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The Court found the legislative history, though unclear on the
precise issue, supportive of the EPA's broad discretion to implement the amendments to the Clean
Air Act. Id. at 862.
80. Id. at 842-43.
81. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3.
82. Id. § 3.3, at 116. Chevron allows Congress to check the executive branch by insuring
that Congress's intent is carried out and it encourages Congress to resolve policy disputes at the
legislative stage. Id.; see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (reasoning that Chevron's separation
of powers rationale allows policy decisions to be determined by political branches rather than the
unelected judiciary branch). But see Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretations of Statutes? A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275 (arguing that Chevron's deference requirement is a self-
imposed limit based on justiciability grounds rather than being constitutionally or statutorily re-
quired).
83. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3; see Pauly v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 696 (1991) (noting that the "resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a ques-
tion of policy than of law"); Oldham, supra note 71, at 393 (explaining that "Chevron's explicit
recognition that statutory interpretation involves significant policy choices has changed the legal
landscape").
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
85. 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.2, at 110 (stating that "Chevron is one of the
most important decisions in the history of administrative law").
[Vol. 73:3
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expansion beyond the "policy" and "law" distinction that the Court initially
made in Chevron.s6 One form that this expansion takes is the interpretation
of contracts by agencies.
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Facts
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,7
the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC) interpretation of a natural gas tariff.8 The tariff applied to
Northwest's "unbundled" customers.89 In response to FERC's order, North-
west filed its tariff in 1985, initiating "open access" transportation under the
Natural Gas Policy Act?0 Section 14.8 of the Act "required each shipper to
pay ... a fuel reimbursement percentage ["FRP"] rate to compensate North-
west for the shipper's pro rata share of the system fuel."' Northwest calcu-
lated its unbundled customers' FRP "by dividing the total amount of system
fuel by the unbundled customers' total annual transportation volumes."92
Northwest Natural Gas Company, one of Northwest's unbundled customers,
challenged the rate by claiming that Northwest had been incorrect in calculat-
ing the FRP based only on unbundled customers' transportation volume in-
stead of the "total annual volume" that the tariff required.93 Northwest's cal-
culation resulted in a higher FRP rate for unbundled customers.94 In interpret-
ing section 14.8 of Northwest's tariff, the commission determined that "total
annual volume" included both unbundled and bundled customers.95 The com-
mission therefore ordered Northwest to issue refunds to affected unbundled
customers. 96
86. See Oldham, supra note 71, at 399-412 (discussing Chevron's expansion to interpretation
of contracts and regulations, and arguing for expansion to agency consent decrees).
87. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
88. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1481-85.
89. Id. at 1482. Bundled customers are charged a single rate for both transportation and
storage costs. Id. Unbundled customers "are charged separately for each component of the ser-
vice." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. System fuel is the amount of fuel lost through leaks plus the amount used to run the
pipeline. Id. Section 14.8 of Northwest's tariff states, "Fuel use requirements shall be determined
using a factor calculated by dividing the total annual fuel and lost and unaccounted-for gas for
Transporter's total transmission system, by the total annual volumes, including gas used for fuel
and lost and unaccounted-for gas." Id. (quoting Northwest Pipeline Corp., 65 F.E.R.C. 61,046,
61,428 n.2 (1993)).
92. Id. at 1483.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1484. The commission concluded that "total annual volume" included both bun-
dled and unbundled customers based on the same canons of contract interpretation that a court
would employ. Id. at 1486.
96. Id. at 1484.
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b. Decision
In reviewing FERC's interpretation of the tariff, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the D.C. Circuit's rationale and concluded that Chevron entitles FERC's inter-
pretation of contractual language to judicial deference.97 The Tenth Circuit
determined that Chevron's emphasis on deference to agency expertise "implic-
itly modified earlier cases that adhered to the traditional rule of withholding
deference on questions of contract interpretation." '98 Because FERC has "vast
experience in the interpretation" of tariffs, the principles underlying Chevron
"clearly dictate[d]" deference to FERC's interpretation." The court concluded
that FERC applied the ordinary meaning of the word "total," which allowed it
to be read consistently throughout the section."° The Tenth Circuit held that
under the adopted D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Chevron, FERC's interpreta-
tion was reasonable and entitled to deference even if it was different than the
interpretation the court itself would have reached.'
3. Analysis
Although the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Williams Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," it remains unclear to
what extent the court will extend deferential treatment outside the area of
tariffs governed by FERC. The Chevron Court reasoned that policy decisions
should be made at the agency level since agencies are closer to the directly
elected executive and legislative branches.0 3 This separation of powers dis-
tinction between policy decisions and questions of law may severely limit the
courts' role as a check on the elected branches of government. Under the
Chevron distinction, a court can only refuse to give deference to an agency's
decision when that agency has disregarded the express intent of Congress. This
interpretation of Chevron may limit a court's ability to exercise effective re-
view, or to engage in "judicial policymaking,"' to situations where the
court perceives a clear attempt to undermine congressional intent, deems it
necessary to exercise a check on the executive and legislative branches, and
feels justified in applying a heightened level of review.
97. Id. at 1486 (citing Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 3
F.3d 1544, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
98. Id. (quoting Williams Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1549 and National Fuel Gas Supply Corp.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869
(1987)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1487. Northwest's interpretation requires the word "total" to take on two different
meanings. Id. For statutory language of the applicable tariff provision, see supra note 91.
101. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1487.
102. 3 F.3d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
104. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3, at 113 (stating that the courts "engage in





The D.C. Circuit has concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron diminished the lower courts' ability to exercise de novo review on
questions of law involving contract interpretations.0 5 According to the D.C.
Circuit, Chevron implicitly modifies cases that have withheld deference on
contract interpretation questions'" In National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," the D.C. Circuit stated that the
agency's greater expertise with the agreement supports deferential review;
however, Chevron alone was sufficient to compel granting deference.0 8
Even when granting deference to an agency's interpretation of a contract,
the reviewing court still must determine if the agency's interpretation is sup-
ported both factually and legally."l An agency's decision must be the result
of reasoned decision-making as ascertained from the record."0 The D.C. Cir-
cuit described three situations in which deference would be inappropriate.'"
First, where an agency's interpretation has vacillated, "granting deference
might give the agency license to act arbitrarily by making inconsistent deci-
sions without justification."" 2 Second, "if the agency itself were an interest-
ed party," deference may be inappropriate." 3 Third, the court would not re-
quire deference where Congress intended courts to independently review agen-
cy decisions." 4
105. National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563,
1570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987). Chevron held that unless Congress directly
addresses the precise issue, a court may not "impose its own construction on the statute," but must
determine if "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843.
106. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570. The D.C. Circuit cited Texas Gas Transmission Corp.
v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960), which upheld an agency's de novo review of a
contract, as being modified by Chevron. Id.
107. 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987).
108. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570; see also Williams Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1549-50
(quoting National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570) (finding that even where a settlement agreement was
purely private, FERC approval is only a further factor for granting deference since "Chevron prin-
ciples alone compel this conclusion").
109. Tarpon Transmission Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 860 F.2d 439, 442
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Vermont Dep't of Public Serv. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
817 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 745 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that "a court need [not] accept an agency
interpretation that black means white"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
110. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 26 F.3d 1129,
1135 (D.C. Ci. 1994) (denying the Commission's interpretation); Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 20 F.3d 494, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the
Commission's interpretation was unreasonable); Tarpon Transmission, 860 F.2d at 442 (conclud-
ing that an agency's analysis was inadequate for meaningful review). But see Natural Gas
Clearinghouse v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 965 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking and upholding the agency's decision
by granting it "substantial deference").
111. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571.
112. Id. National Fuel only suggested a vacillation exception, it did not adopt one. Williams
Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1550.
113. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571.
114. Id.
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In contrast to these opinions, the Fifth Circuit, in Mid Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,"5 held that courts are not re-
quired to defer to agency interpretations when reviewing a settlement con-
tract.1 6 The court stated that contract construction is a question of law which
courts can review "freely.""' 7 The court noted that when the agency's special
understanding of the subject matter enhances its interpretation, there "may be
room to defer to the views of the agency," but such interpretations are not
conclusive."' In Mid Louisiana Gas, however, the Commission relied solely
on the language of the agreement, so there was no agency interpretation to
which the Fifth Circuit could afford deference." 9
II. DEFINING THE RECORD FOR REVIEW IN SOCIAL SECURITY CASES:
O'DELL V. SHALALA 20
A. Background
A determination of social security benefits consists of four stages prior to
judicial review. 2' An initial determination of a claimant's eligibility for ben-
efits and a request for reconsideration constitute the first two stages.'22 If a
claimant seeks reconsideration, the third stage consists of a de novo review of
the initial agency decision at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(AU).'23 The ALJ conducts an informal review and bases her decision on
the evidence presented at the hearing.'24 An ALJ's decision is binding unless
a claimant proceeds to the fourth stage by requesting review at the Appeals
Council (AC)." The AC determines, upon review, whether or not the ALJ
115. 780 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1986).
116. Mid Louisiana Gas, 780 F.2d at 1243; see also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 724 F.2d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that questions of law do
not require technical expertise and are freely reviewable by the court).
117. Mid Louisiana Gas, 780 F.2d at 1243.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
121. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1995). See generally John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency
in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security's Medical-Vocational
Guidelines-Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REv. 329, 334-
35 (1983) (discussing the social security claims process); Wayne A. Kalkwarf, The Jurisdictional
Dilemma in Reopening Social Security Decisions, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545 (1989-90) (discuss-
ing the review and reopening procedures for social security); F. William Hessmer IV, Notes and
Comments, Own Motion Review of Disability Benefit Awards by the Social Security Administra-
tion Appeals Council: The Improper Use of an Important Procedure, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 141, 143
(1988) (discussing the social security adjudication process and levels of agency consideration for
disability claims).
122. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(l)-(a)(2).
123. Id. § (a)(3); Kalkwarf, supra note 121, at 548.
124. Kalkwarf, supra note 121, at 548; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1995) (describing the
AU hearing process which allows claimant to "appear in person, submit new evidence, examine
the evidence used in making the determination or decision under review, and present and question
witnesses").
125. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(4); see also Larry M. Gropman,
Fifteenth Annual Survey of Sixth Circuit Law, Social Security, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 871, 873
(stating that the Appeals Council's purpose is to provide final agency review, ensuring that ALJ
decisions are consistent with overall agency policy).
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based her decision on substantial evidence, abused her discretion, or erred on a
question of law.'2 6 The AC also reviews decisions involving "broad policy or
procedural issue[s]" affecting the public interest.'27
On review, the AC can consider any new evidence that is both material
and relates to the period during which the AU made her decision. 2 ' The
AC, however, relies heavily on the ALJ record when reviewing the AL's
decision.'2 9 Once the AC reviews a case, considers the new evidence, and
renders a decision, that decision is final and the next opportunity for review
occurs at the federal district court level. 3 If the AC denies review by deter-
mining that the new evidence is not material, the ALJ's decision becomes final
and the complainant may then seek judicial review outside of the agency."'
Review in federal district court is available only for "final decisions.' 2
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides the statutory basis for judicial review.'33 A
claimant must, therefore, exhaust all possible administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial review.'34
Courts review social security decisions under the substantial evidence
standard. 5 The reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence
supports the record, but it "may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute
its judgment for that of the agency."'36 The court may also remand the case,
126. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)-(a)(3) (1995).
127. Id. § (a)(4).
128. Id. § (b). Section 404.970(b) states:
If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider the addi-
tional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the date of the adminis-
trative law judge hearing decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record
including the new and material evidence .... It will then review the case if it finds that
the administrative law judge's action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of
the evidence currently of record.
Id. (emphasis added). The new and material evidence must relate to this time period since the
evidentiary record is closed after the AU decision. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The
Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 250 (1990).
129. Hessmer, supra note 121, at 146.
130. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5). A claim must be filed in federal
court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
131. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955(b).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988 & Supp. 1993); Hessmer, supra note 121, at 146 (explaining
that the Appeals Council decision, or the AU's decision if the Appeals Council denies review,
constitutes the final stage of the social security adjudication process). Jurisdiction is granted re-
gardless of the amount in controversy. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
133. Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, When Is Claim Sufficiently Presented to Secretary of Health
and Human Services to Permit Judicial Review Under § 405(g) of Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)), 99 A.L.R. FED. 198, § 2[al, at 203 (1990).
134. Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Provision of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) Making the Secretary of
Health and Human Services' Findings of Fact Conclusive If Supported by Substantial Evidence As
Applying to Administrative Law Judge or Social Security Council, 90 A.L.R. FED. 280, § 2[b], at
289 (1988) (stating that failure to exhaust administrative remedies will lead to dismissal since
section 405(g) only applies to "final decisions").
135. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See generally 2 HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SO-
CIAL SECuRnTY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES, §§ 672, 723, 728 (4th ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993) (dis-
cussing substantial evidence in social security cases).
136. Skutt, supra note 133, § 2[b], at 289. See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 135, §§
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for good cause, to the Commissioner for consideration of new evidence. 3 7
Because § 405(g) requires a court to review the "final decision," and neither §
405(g) nor the regulations define the record of the "final decision" that the
district court must review, the opinions of the circuit courts differ on what
constitutes the proper record of review.'38
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in O'Dell, two district courts within
the Tenth Circuit were in conflict with regard to what record to review.'39 In
Jones v. Sullivan,'" the court held that when the AC denies review, the new
evidence submitted to the AC for consideration becomes part of the record for
review.' 4' The O'Dell district court reached a contrary result, holding that
new evidence submitted to the AC was not part of the record on review. 42
The Tenth Circuit took the opportunity to resolve the conflict when O'Dell
came before it on appeal.'43
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Facts
In O'Dell v. Shalala,'" O'Dell applied for disability benefits alleging an
inability to work. 45 The ALJ determined that O'Dell did not suffer from a
disabling knee condition during the insured period and denied benefits." On
appeal to the AC, O'Dell submitted two new pieces of evidence concerning
her condition."' The AC determined that O'Dell's "new evidence did not
provide a basis for changing the ALJ's decision and declined review.'
'
4
672, 723, 728 (describing the application of substantial evidence during social security review).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g). Section 40 5(g) states:
The court may ... for good cause shown ... remand the case to the Secretary .... and
it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only
upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior pro-
ceeding....
Id. Remand may be allowed where there is a combination of an unrepresented claimant, failure of
the ALJ to fully explore facts and leads, and brevity of the oral hearing. 2 McCoRMICK, supra
note 135, § 754, at 331.
138. Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (11th Cir.
1994). For a discussion of circuit court decisions defining the record of review, see infra notes
161-71 and accompanying text.
139. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857-58 (noting that the district court for the Western District of Okla-
homa refused to consider new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council); Jones v. Sullivan, 804
F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (D. Kan. 1992) (allowing new evidence to be considered).
140. 804 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Kan. 1992).
141. Jones, 804 F. Supp. at 1404 (adopting the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Nelson v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992)).
142. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857-58.
143. Id.
144. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
145. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857.
146. Id.
147. Id. O'Dell submitted a report showing degenerative osteoarthritic changes in her knee
and a physician's letter stating that O'Dell had difficulty standing and walking due to her knee
condition. Id.
148. Id. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (listing the types of cases that the Appeals Coun-




The Tenth Circuit held that the record on review includes new evidence
presented to the AC where the AC declines further review of an AU deci-
sion. 49 After discussing other circuit courts' treatments of the issue, the
Tenth Circuit based its decision to consider new evidence on several fac-
tors. 50 First, relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), the court determined that
the Secretary's regulation "gives a claimant a last opportunity to demonstrate
disability before the decision becomes final."'' Second, the court noted that
the section requires the AC to "evaluate the entire record including the new
and material evidence submitted."''5 2 Last, also under § 404.970(b), the AC
must review the ALJ's decision if the "decision is contrary to the weight of
evidence 'currently of record."""5 In O'Dell, the court determined that the
regulation appeared to incorporate the new evidence into the final record.
5 4
The court therefore concluded that, although the AC declined further review
and upheld the ALl's decision, thus completing the final adjudication within
the agency, the Secretary's final decision included the new evidence consid-
ered by the AC.'55
C. Analysis
Upon review, a court must determine whether the record supports the
AL's decision and whether the AC's decision that the evidence was not "new
and material" was correct, thereby justifying the AC's denial of further re-
view. "'56 To make this determination, a court must review both the AU's re-
cord and the new evidence that the AC relied upon in reaching its conclusion.
Despite the fact that considering "new evidence" on appeal is seemingly
inconsistent with the notion of appellate review,'57 such consideration en-
sures compliance with regulations governing the adjudication process.'58 On-
ly by examining the new evidence presented to the AC may a court determine
whether the AC's decision denying review was correct.'59 The regulations
149. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859.
150. Id. at 858-59. The Tenth Circuit noted that the Seventh and Sixth Circuits review the
AU's decision without considering new evidence while the Fourth, Eight, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits include the new evidence in the final decision under review. Id. For a discussion of other
circuit decisions, see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
151. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (authorizing the Appeals Council to
consider new evidence without a showing of good cause).
152. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)) (emphasis added). For the text
of 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), see supra note 128.
153. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. Upon considering the new evidence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that the Secretary's decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
at 860.
156. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (discussing the effect of the decision); 20 C.F.R. §
404.970 (describing types of cases the Appeals Council will review). By considering the "new"
evidence, which in a sense is no longer "new" once the Appeals Council has considered it, courts
ensure agency compliance with the regulations. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 ("If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals
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establish that once a court determines that the AC was correct in denying re-
view, the ALI's decision becomes final; as a result, a court must examine the
merits of the AL's decision in order to assess whether that decision was
justified." As a result of the division of the process into two distinct seg-
ments, the court is not required to reweigh evidence, only to examine each
record to ensure compliance with the regulations.
D. Other Circuits
Several circuits have held that the record on review must include new
evidence submitted to the AC, even where the AC has denied review.'6 ' The
Ninth Circuit argues that since the AC evaluates the new evidence in deter-
mining whether to review the ALl's decision, courts must consider the new
evidence to determine if the ALJ's decision remains supported by substantial
evidence.' 6 The Eleventh Circuit maintains that each appeal within the ad-
ministrative process contributes to the final record.'63 When the AC denies
review, therefore, the new evidence that it considered becomes part of this re-
cord.'"
In contrast, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that new evidence
presented when the AC denies review may not automatically be considered by
the reviewing court.'65 The Seventh Circuit summarized its position in Eads
v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services," in an at-
tempt to persuade other circuits who are debating the issue to consider its
view.'67 The Seventh Circuit explained that when the AC denies review, this
limits the reviewing federal court to a determination of the correctness of the
Council shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the
date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.") (emphasis added).
160. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955(b) (providing that an ALl's decision is binding unless the Appeals
Council denies review and a claimant seeks judicial review).
161. See, e.g., Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1067 (1lth
Cir. 1994) (stating that new evidence first submitted to the Appeals Council is part of the record
on review); Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994) (considering new evidence but
noting that weighing evidence is a "peculiar task for a reviewing court"); Ramirez v. Shalala, 8
F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that when the Appeals Council examines new evidence
while reviewing the ALU's decision, the evidence is included in the record); Nelson v. Sullivan,
966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that newly submitted evidence not included in the ALl
record became part of the record when it was submitted to the Appeals Council); Wilkins v. De-
partment of Heath and Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cit. 1991) (holding that the Appeals
Council properly incorporated new evidence into the record, which in turn must be considered
when reviewing the Secretary's final decision).
162. Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1452.
163. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1067.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that claimant must
demonstrate good cause justifying remand for consideration of new evidence); Micus v. Bowen,
979 F.2d 602, 606 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that courts do not consider new evidence presented
to the Appeals Council when reviewing the Secretary's final decision because the AU did not
have access to it); Wyatt v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that a court can remand for consideration of new evidence only on a showing that
the new evidence is material).
166. 983 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1993).
167. Eads, 983 F.2d at 818.
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ALJ's decision."6 To determine whether the AL's decision was correct, a
court may look only to evidence presented to the AL, not evidence submitted
to the AC.
69
The Seventh Circuit, in turn, justified its position by emphasizing that
considering new evidence requires a court to "sift and weigh evidence," rather
than review "evidentiary determinations," thereby altering the court's appellate
function. 7 ' Since weighing evidence is "inconsistent with the fundamental
tenets of appellate review," the Seventh Circuit argued that courts must re-
mand pursuant to § 405(g) in order to properly establish an arena for the con-
sideration of new evidence. 7'
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's continued trend of deference to agency decisions calls
into question the ability of administrative law to protect individuals against
abuses of an agency's power. Recent decisions have illustrated this trend by
expanding deference to agency interpretations of contracts, and by converging
the substantial evidence and the arbitrary and capricious standards. By con-
tinuing to interpret the standards of review as limiting the court's ability to
question agency decisions, the Tenth Circuit has denied adequate protection to
individuals.' The Tenth Circuit did give more credence to the protections of
administrative law in the realm of social security by reviewing all of the evi-
dence presented in the administrative agency review procedures. Since agen-
cies have the authority to promulgate, enforce, and adjudicate rules, the level
of scrutiny that courts exercise should reflect the agency's authority, thus
ensuring a sufficient check on the administrative branch.
Paul Enockson
168. Id. at 817.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 817-18.
171. Id. The minority circuits argue that the proper procedure should be to remand pursuant to
§ 405(g), under which the claimant must prove that her evidence is "new and material." Cotton, 2
F.3d at 696. However, the regulations do not require a showing of good cause, as required by §
405(g), for consideration of new evidence. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (lacking a good cause
requirement) with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (stating that a showing of good cause for evidence submit-
ted during the administrative process would undermine the Secretary's regulations specifically
allowing evidence to be submitted without such a showing).
172. See SCHWARTz, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624 (arguing that judicial review becomes
meaningless when the standards of review are too restrictive).
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